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Abstract
Classical studies on aspiration-based dynamics suggest that a dissatisfied individual changes
strategy without taking into account the success of others. This promotes defection spread-
ing. The imitation-based dynamics allow individuals to imitate successful strategies with-
out taking into account their own-satisfactions. In this article, we propose to study a
dynamic based on aspiration which takes into account imitation of successful strategies
for dissatisfied individuals. This helps cooperative members to resist. Individuals com-
pare their success to their desired satisfaction level before making a decision to update
their strategies. This mechanism helps individuals with a minimum of self-satisfaction
to maintain their strategies. If an individual is dissatisfied, it will learn from others by
choosing successful strategies. We derive an exact expression of the fixation probability
in well-mixed populations as in structured populations in networks. As a result, we show
that selection may favor cooperation more than defection in well-mixed populations as in
populations ranged over a regular graph. We show that the best scenario is a graph with
a small connectivity.
Keywords and phrases: Fixation probability; Evolutionary game dynamics; Pair ap-
proximation; Cooperation; ; Evolutionary graph theory; Imitation; Aspiration
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the framework where the frequency of a strategy depends
on the fitnesses of the different individuals in the population (Maynard Smith and Price
[Maynard(1973)], Maynard Smith [Maynard(1982)], Hofbauer and Sigmund [Hofbauer(1988)],
Weibull [Weibull(1995)], Samuelson [Samuelson(1997)], Cressman [Cressman(2003)], Vin-
cent and Brown [Vincent(2005)], Nowak [Nowak(2006)]). Individuals interact and gain
payoffs, which are seen as biological fitness or reproductive rates.
The standard model, called the replicator equation, was formulated in an infinitely
large well-mixed population where any two individuals have the same probability to inter-
act (Taylor and Jonker [Taylor(1978)], Zeeman [Zeeman(1980)], Hofbauer and Sigmund
[Hofbauer(1998), Hofbauer(2003)]). Suppose that there are n strategies {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}.
The game is described by a payoff matrix A = {ai,j}i,j=1,...,n, where ai,j is the payoff of an
Si-player if its partner is Sj-player. Let xi be the frequency of Si-players in the population.
The dynamic is
dxi
dt
= xi(fi − f), (1)
where fi =
n∑
j=1
xjai,j and f =
n∑
i=1
xifi refer to the expected payoff on an Si-player, and
the average payoff in the population, respectively.
Real populations are finite and deterministic approaches cannot capture this finiteness.
Recently, a stochastic approach is introduced to model this finiteness by a Markov chain
with a finite state space. In the absence of mutation, the Markov chain has absorbing
states represented by a population of a unique type. A strategy is said to be favored by
selection if its fixation probability is greater than what it would be under neutrality (Nowak
et al. [Nowak(2004)], Imhof and Nowak [Imhof(2006)]). In the presence of symmetric
mutation, this Markov chain is irreducible, and as a result, it has a stationary state. An
interest in the frequency of a given strategy in this equilibrium states arises. In this case,
a strategy is said to be favored by selection if its average frequency in the stationary
state is greater than what it would be under neutrality (absence of selection) (Antal et
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al. [Antal(2009)]). Both models, without mutation and with mutation, share the same
favored strategy if the mutation rate is small enough (Rousset and Billiard [Rousset(2000)],
Rousset [Rousset(2003)], Fudenberg and Imhof [Fudenberg(2006)]).
Further advances in evolutionary game theory study structured populations. The
traditional setting is the island model where individuals are structured into isolated islands
(Ladret and Lessard [Ladret(2007)]; Lessard [Lessard(2011)]). Interactions occur only
within islands. After reproduction, individuals can migrate or stay in the parent’s island.
The case of isolation by distance, called stepping stone model, is considered in Rousset and
Billiard [Rousset(2000)], and Rousset [Rousset(2006)]. Islands are numbered 1, 2, . . . , d
and the migrate rates are mi,i+1 = mi,i−1 = m/2, mi,i = 1−m, and 0 otherwise.
In these structured models, individuals share the same neighborhood if they belong
to the same group, or they do not have any common neighbor if they belong to two
different groups. Evolutionary graph theory is a natural extension to take into account
that individuals can share only some of their neighbors (Nowak and May [Nowak(1992)],
Hauert and Doebeli [Haeurt(2004)],Lieberman et al. [Lieberman(2005)], Ohtsuki et al.
[Ohtsuki(2006)], Taylor et al. [Taylor(2007)]). It is a powerful framework that includes
social networks in the evolutionary process. N individuals occupy N nodes. Each node is
linked to k nodes by edges. Each edge indicates who can interact with whom.
For a graph of degree k = 2, the evolutionary process is described in many studies
(Ohtsuki and Nowak [Ohtsuki(2006)], van Valen and Nowak [Veelen(2012)]). The popula-
tion state is described completely by the frequency of each strategy. A condition, to favor
a strategy over another strategy in a finite population, can be derived as in well-mixed
populations.
For general degree, the frequencies of the different strategies are not enough to de-
scribe the evolutionary process. To simplify the complexity of such a graph, a tech-
nique of pair approximation (Matsuda et al. [Matsuda(1987), Matsuda(1992)], Naka-
mura et al. [Nakamaru(1997)], Keeling [Keeling(1999)], Haraguchi and Sasaki [?], Van
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Baalen [Baalen(2000)]) is introduced in regular graphs (Ohtsuki et al.[Ohtsuki(2006),
Ohtsuki(2006), Ohtsuki(2007)]). It is a framework to study the stochastic dynamics in
graphs not only by considering the global frequency pC of a given strategy C, but also
by considering qC|C , the probability that a neighbor of a C-player, is of type C. This
technique is limited to a large population such that k << N .
Besides, update rules, in which individuals correct their strategies following a selection
mechanism, are of greater importance for their confirmed impact on the evolutionary
process. For this reason, one of the most open questions is how do individuals update
their current strategy based on their knowledge of themselves and others.
Many update rules have been proposed. The most used are based in two representative
models: imitation-based rule (Ohtsuki et al. [Ohtsuki(2006)], Szabo´ and Tke [ST(1998)],
Traulsen et al. [Traulsen(2007)]) and aspiration-based rule (Chen and Wang [Chen(2008)],
Du et al. [Du(2014)]). Under imitation-based rule, individuals update their strategies
based on their knowledge of others. An individual compares its payoff with its neighbors’
payoffs before making a decision. If its payoff is lower, it would imitate its neighbors with a
higher probability. Under aspiration-based rule, individuals update their strategies based
on their knowledge about themselves. An individual compares its payoff to an aspiration
level, which represents its tolerance with its current strategy. If its payoff is lower, it would
switch its strategy with a higher probability.
Aspiration-driven update rules help individuals to keep their successful strategies if
they reach the aspirated levels. For instance, in case of conflict between the private in-
formation (memory of the route) and social information (trail pheromone), experienced
ants choose to follow the route to their previous trips (Gru¨ter et al. [Gruter(2011)]). The
same conclusion was inferred in experiments on fish stickleback, where an experienced
forager ignored conflicting public information in favor of trustworthy private information
(van Bergen et al. [Bergen(2004)]). Also, it has been shown that self-evaluation mecha-
nisms, called ”Satisficing”, is a mainstream to understand social and economic problems
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in human interactions (Simon [Simon(1955), Simon(1957)]).
In case of dissatisfaction, rational individuals will not randomly explore their neighbor-
hood. A dissatisfied individual will take into account the success of its neighbors. Here,
we proposed an update rule based on aspiration and imitation to explain cooperation
spreading in structured populations as in well-mixed populations. If the strategy gives
its player a certain benefit, it will be maintained with a higher probability. A dissatisfied
individual will explore its neighborhood by considering their success.
In this article, we study a regular graph of degree k, where the update mechanism
is composed of two rounds. In the first round, individuals compares their payoffs to a
personal tolerance index. Satisfied individuals keep their current strategy with higher
probability. Dissatisfied individuals will explore the success of their neighbors with a
higher probability. The focal individual used its payoff only to decide if it will keep its
strategy, in case of satisfaction, or if it will imitate a neighbor, in case of dissatisfaction.
More precisely, a random individual I compares its payoff ΠI to its satisfaction level αI .
It will maintain its current strategy with probability proportional to ΠI −αI . Otherwise,
it will adopt a neighbor’s strategy proportional to its fitness.
This model is equivalent to the following death-birth update. At each time step,
a randomly chosen individual survives with probability proportional to the relative size
ΠI − αI . Otherwise, it dies. In this case, a competition between its neighbors arises. A
neighbour is chosen proportional to its fitness to produce a copy, which will occupy the
vacant position. It is similar to the death-birth update rule (Ohtsuki et al. [Ohtsuki(2006),
Ohtsuki(2006)]), where the death event occurs with probability 1.
As Ohtsuki et al. [Ohtsuki(2006)], we use a pair approximation technique and a diffu-
sion approximation, to derive an estimation of the fixation probability in graphs of degree
3 ≤ k << N . We use en exact calculation technique for circular model, k = 2, and
well-mixed model, k = N . Then, we compare the success of cooperation and defection.
We show that cooperation is favored if the ratio benefit-to-cost b/c exceeds some critical
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value that depends on the graph degree, k.
The remainder of this paper is divided in 5 sections. In Section 2, we describe our
model. In Section 3, we study the global frequency pC and the local frequency qC|C .
We describe the quasi-steady state and then we derive an approximation of the fixation
probability of strategy C in Section 4. In Section 5, we test the success of cooperation
comparing to defection. We study the additive prisoner dilemma in Section 6. We finish
this article by a discussion in Section 7.
2 Model
Consider a finite population composed of N individuals distributed over N nodes of a
graph. Each node is related by edges to other k nodes. k, called the graph degree, is the
same for all individuals (see Figure 1). Each edge indicates who interacts with whom.
Any two individuals who are related by an edge are called neighbors. Suppose that there
is no loops to cancel self-interaction. Moreover, suppose that the graph is connected in
the sense that any two nodes are linked by a finite number of edges. Each individual can
adopt a strategy among {C,D}: C for cooperation and D for defection.
At each time step, each individual interacts with its neighbors through the game matrix


C D
C R S
D T P

. (2)
Two cooperators receive a reward, R, whereas two defectors receive a punishment, P . if
they interact, a cooperator receives a sucker, S, while a defector receives a temptation, T .
After interactions with its neighbors, any individual accumulates a payoff denoted by Π.
Then, a randomly chosen individual I will compare its payoff ΠI to its satisfaction index
αI , which represents its tolerance with its current strategy. Here, we study the simplest
case where the satisfaction level depends on the strategy. Individual I will keep its current
7
C C
D
DD
D
(a) k = 2
C C
D
DD
D
(b) k = 3
C C
D
DD
D
(c) k = 4
Figure 1: Each individual is related exactly to k neighbours. k is the same for all indi-
viduals, which is called the graph degree. Red nodes are occupied by defectors while blue
nodes are occupied by cooperators.
strategy with probability
g
(
δ(αI −ΠI)
)
, (3)
where δ is a non-negative constant called the selection intensity. It will update its current
strategy with the complementary, probability
1− g
(
δ(αI −ΠI)
)
. (4)
In this case, it adopts the strategy of one of its neighbors, say J , chosen with probability
proportional to its fitness fJ = 1 + δΠJ . More precisely, let J1, J2, . . . , Jk the neighbors
of individual I. Individual I will adopt the strategy of one of a neighbor Ji with prob-
ability fJi/
∑k
l=1 fJl, for i = 1, . . . , k. This mechanism helps individual I to learn from
its neighbors by selecting the most successful strategy. This does not mean that the cho-
sen strategy will be suitable for individual I since it has a different neighborhood than
individual J .
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Here, we assume that g is a function such that
• g(0) = 1/2: under neutrality δ = 0, updating and maintaining occur with the same
probability, that is 1/2.
• g′(0) < 0: for δ > 0 very small, we have
g
(
δ(αI −ΠI)
)
≈
1
2
− δ · g′(0)(αI −ΠI).
Then maintaining occurs proportional to the individual satisfaction ΠI − αI .
If ΠI > αI , individuals maintain their strategies with a probability higher than 1/2. If
ΠI < αI , individuals maintain their strategies with a probability lower than 1/2. If
ΠI = αI , individuals maintain their strategy with probability 1/2. The most used function
is the Fermi rule
g(x) =
1
1 + e−x
. (5)
Neutral model is the case δ = 0. The case of weak selection corresponds to δ > 0 very
small. This case is presented in most studies in genetic populations, molecular evolution
and cultural evolution (Kimura [Kimura(198)]), Traulsen et al. [Traulsen(2007)], Traulsen
et al. [Traulsen(2010)], Wu et al. [Wu(2014)]). In this case, the effect of payoff differences
on the evolutionary process is small. Weak selection is a reasonable assumption for two
reasons:
• It is a standard case to derive many analytic results which are not possible for any
selection intensity, but these results stay a good approximation for other selection
intensities
• In real biological populations, the fitness of an individual depends on many com-
petitions (games), and then each game makes a small contribution, and here we
interested only by a game.
In the remainder, we are interested in the effect of weak selection on the evolutionary
process. We use Fermi rule (5), where g′(0) = −1/4 < 0.
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3 Rate of change under weak selection
Define pX and pXY as the frequencies of strategy X and pairs of type XY , respectively,
for X,Y ∈ {C,D}. Denote by qY |X = pXY /pX the probability that a given neighbor of an
X-strategist is a Y -strategist. As a result of basic probability properties, these quantities
are related by the following relations
pC + pD = 1,
pXY = qX|Y pY = qY |XpX = pY X , (6)
qA|Y + qB|Y = 1.
Using these identities, we can express all these probabilities in terms of pC and qC|C
pD = 1− pC ,
pCC = qC|CpC ,
qD|C = 1− qC|C ,
pCD = qD|CpC = (1− qC|C)pC , (7)
qC|D =
pCD
pD
=
(1− qC|C)pC
1− pC
,
qD|D = 1− qC|D = 1−
(1− qC|C)pC
1− pC
,
pDD = qD|DpD = 1− pC − (1− qC|C)pC .
Based on the above identities, the evolutionary process is completely described through
pC and qC|C .
In next subsections, we derive the changes in one times steps of pC and qC|C , respec-
tively, to characterize the evolutionary process of our model.
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3.1 Payoffs
Assume that the selected individual, I, is an X-strategist, and that its neighborhood is
formed by kC cooperators and kD = k − kC defectors. Therefore, its expected payoff is
ΠX =


kCR+kDS
k
if X = C,
kCT+kDP
k
if X = D.
(8)
In the second round, individual I will adopt a neighbor’s strategy. Then, we must
consider the neighborhood’s payoffs of I. Let individual J , a Y -player, be a random
neighbor of individual I, and let ΠY |X be its expected payoff of individual J . Hence, with
reasoning based on the strategies of individuals I and J , we have
ΠC|C =
[1 + (k − 1)qC|C ]R+ (k − 1)qD|CS
k
,
ΠC|D =
(k − 1)qC|CR+ [1 + (k − 1)qD|C ]S
k
,
ΠD|C =
[1 + (k − 1)qC|D]T + (k − 1)qD|DP
k
,
ΠD|D =
(k − 1)qC|DT + [1 + (k − 1)qD|D]P
k
.
(9)
Proof. Start with the first payoff in Eq. (9). Assume that I and J are two cooperators.
In addition of I, individual J has other k − 1 neighbors. Each one of them is of type C
with probability qC|C , or of type D with probability qD|C = 1 − qC|C . In average, the
neighborhood of individual J is composed of 1 + (k − 1)qC|C cooperators and (k − 1)qD|C
defectors. This explains the form of the expected payoff. Similarly, we have the other
payoffs in Eq. (9).
3.2 Change in pC
The frequency of C, pC , increases if a defector becomes a cooperator. A defector is selected
to update its strategy with probability pD. Its neighborhood is formed by kC cooperators
and kD = k − kC defectors with probability
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D , for kC = 0, 1, . . . , k. It will
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choose to update its strategy with probability
1
1 + eδ(ΠD−αD)
=
1
2
+ δ ·
αD −ΠD
4
+O(δ2).
Here O(δn) means that the error is of order of δn for n ∈ N. Finally, it becomes a
cooperator with probability
kC(1 + δΠC|D)
kC(1 + δΠC|D) + (k − kC)(1 + δΠD|D)
=
kC
k
+δ
kC(k − kC)
k2
(ΠC|D−ΠD|D)+O(δ
2). (10)
In this case, the change is ∆pC =
1
N
. Summarize this event in the following probability
P
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
= pD︸︷︷︸
select a defector
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D︸ ︷︷ ︸
its neighborhood
1
1 + eδ(ΠD−αD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it updates its strategy
kC(1 + δΠC|D)
kC(1 + δΠC|D) + kD(1 + δΠD|D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it becomes a cooperator
=
pD
2k
k∑
kC=0
kC
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D +
δpD
2
k∑
kC=0
kC
k
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D
×
[k − kC
k
(ΠC|D −ΠD|D) +
αD −ΠD
2
]
+O(δ2).
(11)
Using Eq. (9) and the first two moments of the binomial distribution,
k∑
kC=0
kC ×
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D =
k∑
kC=0
kC ×
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|D(1− qC|D)
k−kC = kqC|D,
k∑
kC=0
k2C ×
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D =
k∑
kC=0
k2C ×
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|D(1− qC|D)
k−kC = kqC|D + k(k − 1)q
2
C|D,
(12)
yield
P
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
=
pDqC|D
2
+
δpD
4k
[
2(k − 1)qC|DqD|D(ΠC|D −ΠD|D) + kqC|DαD
− (1 + (k − 1)qC|D)qC|DT − (k − 1)qC|DqD|DP
]
+O(δ2)
=
pCD
2
+
δpCD
4k
[
I+RR+ I
+
S S − I
+
T T − I
+
P P + kαD
]
+O(δ2), (13)
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where
I+R =
2(k − 1)2
k
qC|CqD|D,
I+S =
2(k − 1)
k
qD|D
(
1 + (k − 1)qD|C
)
,
I+T = 1 + (k − 1)qC|D +
2(k − 1)2
k
qD|DqC|D,
I+P =
k − 1
k
qD|D
(
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)qD|D
)
.
(14)
The frequency of C, pC , decreases if a cooperator becomes a defector. In this case, the
change is ∆pC = −
1
N
. This happens with probability
P
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
= pC︸︷︷︸
select a cooperator
k∑
kC=0
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C︸ ︷︷ ︸
its neighborhood
1
1 + eδ(ΠC−αC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it updates its strategy
(k − kC)(1 + δΠD|C)
kC(1 + δΠC|C) + (k − kC)(1 + δΠD|C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
it becomes a defector
=
pC
2k
k∑
kC=0
(k − kC)
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C +
δpC
2k
k∑
kC=0
(k − kC)
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C
×
(kC
k
(ΠD|C −ΠC|C) +
αC −ΠC
2
)
+O(δ2)
=
pCD
2
+
δpCD
4k
(
− I−RR− I
−
S S + I
−
T T + I
−
P P + kαC
)
+O(δ2), (15)
where
I−R =
k − 1
k
qC|C
(
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)qC|C
)
,
I−S = 1 + (k − 1)qD|C +
2(k − 1)2
k
qC|CqD|C ,
I−T =
2(k − 1)
k
qC|C
(
1 + (k − 1)qC|D
)
,
I−P =
2(k − 1)2
k
qC|CqD|D.
(16)
Denote by p˙A the rate of change of pC in one time step. Using Eqs (13) and (15), we
obtain
p˙C =
1
N
P
(
∆pC =
1
N
)
−
1
N
P
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
=
δpCD
4Nk
[
IRR+ ISS − ITT − IPP + k∆α
]
+O(δ2), (17)
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where
IR = I
+
R + I
−
R =
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)(qC|C + qD|D)
]k − 1
k
qC|C ,
IS = I
+
S + I
−
S =1 + (k − 1)qD|C +
2(k − 1)2
k
(qC|C + qD|D)qD|C +
2(k − 1)qD|D
k
,
IT = I
+
T + I
−
T =1 + (k − 1)qC|D +
2(k − 1)2
k
(qC|C + qD|D)qC|D +
2(k − 1)qC|C
k
,
IP = I
+
P + I
−
P =
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)(qC|C + qD|D)
]k − 1
k
qD|D,
(18)
and ∆α = αD − αC . ∆α is the satisfaction level difference between defectors and cooper-
ators.
3.3 Change in qC|C
Since qC|C = pCC/pC , we must start by the rate of change of pCC , the frequency of CC-
pairs. Note that the total number of all pairs is kN/2 as each individual has k neighbors.
pCC changes if a defector becomes a cooperator or a cooperator becomes a defector. Let I
be the selected individual and assume that its neighborhood is formed by kC cooperators
and k − kC defectors.
The number of pairs CC will increase by kC if a defector becomes a cooperator. This
occurs with probability
P
(
∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)
=pD
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D ×
1
1 + eδ(ΠD−αD)
×
kC(1 + δΠC|D)
kC(1 + δΠC|D) + (k − kC)(1 + δΠD|D)
=
kCpD
2k
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
kD
D|D +O(δ), (19)
The number of pairs CC will decrease by kC if a cooperator becomes a defector. This
occurs with probability
P
(
∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)
=pC
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C ×
1
1 + eδ(ΠC−αC)
×
kD(1 + δΠD|C)
kC(1 + δΠC|C) + (k − kC)(1 + δΠD|C)
=
pC(k − kC)
2k
(
k
kC
)
qkC
D|Cq
kD
C|C +O(δ). (20)
Let p˙CC be the rate of change of pCC in one time step. Using Eqs (12), (20) and (20),
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yield
p˙CC =
k∑
kC=0
2kC
kN
[
P
(
∆pCC =
2kC
kN
)
− P
(
∆pCC = −
2kC
kN
)]
=
k∑
kC=1
2kC
kN
[
kCpD
2k
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D −
(k − kC)pC
2k
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C
]
+O(δ)
=
pD
k2N
k∑
kC=0
k2C
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Dq
k−kC
D|D −
pC
k2N
k∑
kC=0
kC(k − kC)
(
k
kC
)
qkC
C|Cq
k−kC
D|C +O(δ)
=
pD
k2N
(
kqC|D − k(k − 1)q
2
C|D
)
−
pC
k2N
(
k2qC|C − kqC|C − k(k − 1)q
2
C|C
)
+O(δ)
=
pCD
kN
(
1 + (k − 1)(qC|D − qC|C)
)
+O(δ). (21)
As a result, the rate of change of qC|C in one time step is
q˙C|C =
p˙CC
pC
=
pCD
kNpC
(
1 + (k − 1)(qC|D − qC|C)
)
+O(δ)
=
1− qC|C
kN
{
1 + (k − 1)
pC − qC|C
1− pC
}
+O(δ). (22)
In the last step, we have used Eq (7).
4 The quasi-steady state
As a consequence of Eqs (17) and (22), the local density qC|C equilibrates much more
quickly than the global density pC (Ohtsuki and Nowak [Ohtsuki(2006)]). Therefore, the
dynamical system rapidly converges onto a quasi-steady state, defined by q˙C|C = 0, or
more explicitly,
qC|C =
1
k − 1
+
k − 2
k − 1
pC . (23)
It is the key relationship, which is obtained in many studies of structured populations in
regular graphs (Ohtsuki et al. [Ohtsuki(2006), Ohtsuki(2007)]).
Instead of studying a diffusion process in terms of two variables, pC and qC|C , by this
relation we describe the system by one-dimensional diffusion process in terms of pC only.
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With a short interval ∆t, we have
E
[
∆pC
∣∣∣pC(0) = p] = p˙C∆t
(
≡ µ(p)∆t
)
. (24)
Using Eq (17) and the coefficients Ii for i = R,S, T, P , derived in Appendix A, we obtain
µ(p) =
δ(k − 2)
4Nk2(k − 1)
p(1− p)
(
Γ0 + k
2∆α+ Γ1p
)
. (25)
Here
Γ0 = (3k + 2)R+ (3k
2 − 3k − 2)S − (k + 2)T − (3k + 2)(k − 1)P,
Γ1 = (3k + 2)(k − 2)(R − S − T + P ). (26)
For the variance, we have
var
[
∆pC
∣∣∣pC(0) = p] = E[(∆pC)2∣∣∣pC(0) = p]− E[∆pC∣∣∣pC(0) = p]2
=
1
N2
(
P
(
∆pC = −
1
N
)
+ P
(
∆pC =
1
N
))
∆t+O(δ2)∆t
≃
(k − 2)
N2(k − 1)
p(1− p)∆t
(
≡ ν(p)∆t
)
. (27)
Conditions (25) and (27) ensure the diffusion approximation with drift function µ(x) and
diffusion function ν(x).
Suppose that a proportion p of cooperators appears in a population of defectors,
p ∈ (0, 1). As a result, there are two possibilities for the evolutionary dynamics. The
first scenario is that this proportion produces a lineage, which will eventually invade the
entire population (extinction of defectors x = 1). The second scenario is that these pro-
portion might die before reproducing or generate a lineage that disappears after sometime
(extinction of cooperators x = 0). Then, x = 0 and x = 1 are absorbing states of the
diffusion process.
Let φδC(p, t) be the probability that absorption has occurred at x = 1 at or before t. The
backward Kolomogov equation (Kimura [Kimura(1962)], Crow and Kimura [Crow(1970)],
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Ewens [Ewens(2004)]) can be written as
∂φδC(p, t)
∂t
= µ(p)
∂φδC(p, t)
∂p
+
ν(p)
2
∂2φδC(p, t)
∂p2
(28)
with boundary conditions φδC(0, t) = 0 and φ
δ
C(1, t) = 1.
By letting t→∞, the limit
φδC(p) = lim
t→∞
φδC(p, t) (29)
represents the fixation probability of cooperators given an initial frequency p. As t→∞,
the left-hand side in (28) tends to 0, since φδC(p, t) tends to be constant. Therefore, Eq.
(28) becomes
µ(x)
dφδC
dx
(x) +
ν(x)
2
d2φδC
dx2
(x) = 0, (30)
with the boundary conditions, φδC(0) = 0 and φ
δ
C(1) = 1. The solution of Eq (30) is
φδC(p) =
∫ p
0
exp
{
−
∫ x
0
2µ(y)
ν(y)
dy
}
dx
/∫ 1
0
exp
{
−
∫ x
0
2µ(y)
ν(y)
dy
}
dx. (31)
Using Eqs (25) and (27), we have
exp
{
−
∫ x
0
2µ(y)
v(y)
dy
}
=exp
{
−
∫ x
0
δN
2k2
(Γ1y + Γ0)dy
}
=exp
{−δN
4k2
(Γ1x
2 + 2Γ0x+ k
2∆αx)
}
=1− δ ·
N
4k2
[
Γ1x
2 + 2Γ0x+ 2k
2∆αx
]
+O(δ2). (32)
Integrating Eq (32), we have the key approximation
φδC(p) =
∫ p
0
(
1− δ · N4k2 (Γ1x
2 + 2Γ0x+ 2k
2∆αx)
)
dx+O(δ2)∫ 1
0
(
1− δ · N4k2 (Γ1x
2 + 2Γ0x+ 2k2∆αx)
)
dx+O(δ2)
=
p− δ · N
4k2
[
Γ1p3
3 + Γ0p
2 + k2∆αp2)
]
+O(δ2)
1− δ · N4k2
[
Γ1
3 + Γ0 + k
2∆α
]
+O(δ2)
=
[
p− δ ·
N
4k2
(Γ1p3
3
+ Γ0p
2 + k2∆αp2
)]
×
[
1 + δ ·
N
4k2
(Γ1
3
+ Γ0 + k
2∆α
)]
+O(δ2)
=p+ δ ·
Np(1− p)
12k2
[
Γ1 + 3Γ0 + 3k
2∆α+ Γ1p
]
+O(δ2). (33)
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Similarly, let φδD(p) be the probability that a proportion p of defectors takes over a
population of cooperators. Since there is ultimate fixation of cooperation or defection with
probability 1, we have
φδD(p) = 1− φ
δ
C(1− p) = p− δ ·
Np(1− p)
12k2
[
2Γ1 + 3Γ0 + 3k
2∆α− Γ1p
]
+O(δ2). (34)
5 Fixation probabilities
5.1 First test: ρC(δ) > ρC(0)
A first criterion, for weak selection to favor the emergence and stabilization of coop-
eration, is the comparison of the fixation probability under weak selection, ρC(δ) =
φδC(1/N), to what it would be under neutrality, ρC(0) = φ
0
C(1/N) (Rousset and Billiard
[Rousset(2000)], Nowak et al. [Nowak(2004)], Taylor et al. [?]). We say that selection
favors the fixation of cooperation if ρC(δ) > ρC(0). Otherwise, that is ρC(δ) < ρC(0), we
say that selection opposes the fixation of cooperation. Using Eq (33), we have
ρC(0) = 1/N,
ρC(δ) = ρC(0) + δ ·
N − 1
12Nk2
[
Γ1 + 3Γ0 + 3k
2∆α
]
+O(δ2).
(35)
Accordingly, ρC(δ) > ρC(0) if Γ0 + 3Γ1 + 3k
2∆α > 0, which is equivalent to
3k2 + 5k + 2
3k2
R+
6k2 − 5k − 2
3k2
S −
3k2 − k + 2
3k2
T −
6k2 + k − 2
3k2
P +∆α > 0. (36)
This condition is valid for k ≥ 3. Note that the above calculation is valid only for k ≥ 3
since both the expectation and the variance, given by Eqs (25) and (27), are zero.
For k = 2 and finite population, the fixation probability ρC(δ) is derived in Eq. (69),
in Appendix B. In this case ρC(δ) > ρC(0) if
2N2 − 7N + 7
N(N − 1)
R+
N2 + 2N − 3
N(N − 1)
S −
N2 − 2N + 5
N(N − 1)
T −
2N2 − 3N − 5
N(N − 1)
P +∆α > 0. (37)
For large population, N →∞, it is equivalent to
2R + S − T − 2P +∆α > 0,
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which extends Eq. (36) for k = 2.
If inequality (36) is reversed, weak selection opposes the fixation of cooperation,
ρC(δ) < ρC(0). This does not mean that weak selection favors the fixation of defec-
tion. Similarly, from Eq. (34), we have ρD(δ)) > ρD(0) if 2Γ0 + 3Γ1 + 3k
2∆α < 0, which
is equivalent to
6k2 + k − 2
3k3
R+
3k2 − k + 2
3k2
S −
6k2 − 5k − 2
3k2
T −
3k2 + 5k + 2
3k2
P +∆α < 0. (38)
5.2 Second test: ρC(δ) > ρD(δ)
It is possible that weak selection favors the fixation of cooperation and defection or opposes
the fixation of cooperation and defection. As a result, comparing the fixation probability
to what it would be under neutrality does not give a complete view of the success of a
strategy. Then, a second criterion is introduced (Nowak et al. [Nowak(2004)]), based on
the comparison of the fixation probabilities, to measure the most successful strategy. If
ρC(δ) > ρD(δ), then the invasion of a single cooperating in an all defecting population
is more likely than the reverse situation. In such a case, we say that the evolution of
cooperation is more favored by selection than the evolution of defection.
Using Eqs (33) and (34), we have
φδC(p)
φδD(p)
= 1 + δ ·
N(1− p)
4k2
[
Γ1 + 2Γ0 + 2k
2∆α
]
+O(δ2). (39)
Particularly for p = N−1, we have
ρC(δ)
ρD(δ)
= 1 + δ ·
N − 1
4k2
[
Γ1 + 2Γ0 + 2k
2∆α
]
+O(δ2). (40)
Accordingly, we have ρC(δ) > ρD(δ) if Γ1 + 2Γ0 + 2k
2∆α > 0, which is equivalent to
3k + 2
2k
(R− P ) +
3k − 2
2k
(S − T ) + ∆α > 0 (41)
This equation predicts the success of cooperators more often than defectors. It is valid for
k ≥ 3.
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For k = 2 and by using Eq. (70), ρC(δ) > ρD(δ) if
(2N − 5)(R − P ) +N(S − T ) +N∆α > 0. (42)
For large population size N →∞, it is equivalent to
2R + S − T − 2P +∆α > 0, (43)
which extends Eq. (41) for k = 2.
For symmetric aspiration, αD = αC , Eq (41) can be written as
σR+ S > T + σP, (44)
where σ = 3k+23k−2 is the structure coefficient (Tarnita et al. [Tarnita(2009)]). σ describes
the structure and the update rule effects on the evolutionary process. It depends only on
the population structure and the update rule and not on the game matrix. It quantifies
the degree for which individuals of the same type are more likely to meet than individuals
of different types. If we select two neighbors, then with probability 1/(1 + σ) we have
different types and with probability σ/(1 + σ) we have the same type.
The game is equivalent to a well-mixed population without structure, where each indi-
vidual can interact with any other individual through the effective game matrix (Lessard
[Lessard(2011)]), given by
Aeff =

σR S
T σP

 . (45)
Note that σ converges to 1 as k →∞. Therefore, the normal payoff matrix (2) is obtained
in the limit where each individual interacts with any other individuals. This describes
exactly a well-mixed population and the limit of condition (44) is
R+ S > T + P.
This is exactly condition derived from Eq. (77) for a large well-mixed population.
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6 Example: Simplified prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider the simplified additive prisoner’s Dilemma given by matrix


C D
C b− c −c
D b 0

. (46)
A cooperator pays a cost, c > 0, to receive a benefit, b > c, if its partner is a cooperator. A
defector benefits by receiving b if its partner cooperates. This is one of the most important
social dilemmas, which can be used to quantify the effectiveness of cooperation via the
benefit-to-cost ratio b/c. This ratio is an indicator of the performance of cooperation in
structured populations as in well-mixed populations.
Using conditions (36) and (38) with the new entries, we have ρC(δ) >
1
N
> ρC(δ) if
2
k
b− 3c+∆α > 0. (47)
The difference in aspiration level, ∆α = αD−αC , is a form of compensation to cooperators
for their behavior. If the compensation ∆α exceeds the payoff difference, then, selection
favors cooperation more than defection.
Otherwise, that is 2
k
b − 3c + ∆α < 0, we have ρC(δ) <
1
N
< ρC(δ). In this case, the
difference in aspiration level, ∆α, is not enough to compensate cooperators to evolve and
take over the population. Selection should promote defection more than cooperation.
Positive values of ∆α = αD − αC > 0 play in favor of cooperation since this reduces
the cooperation effort c. With an appropriate values of ∆α, a cooperator will be more
satisfied than a defector since its tolerance index αC is lower than that one a defector, αD.
This allows cooperators to maintain their strategy more frequently than defectors. This
increases the updating frequency of defectors until they finish by accepting cooperation.
Consider the case where each type aspirates the maximum payoff that can receive it,
αC = (b − c) and αD = b. Then, the difference in aspiration level is ∆α = c. Condition
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(47) for selection to favor cooperation more than defection becomes
b
c
> k. (48)
This is typically the condition derived by Ohtsuki et al. [Ohtsuki(2006)] for death-birth
updating. At each time step, an individual is selected to die. A neighbour is selected
with probability proportional to its fitness to give birth a copy, which will take the vacant
position.
If both strategies have the same satisfaction level, ∆α = 0, then weak selection favors
cooperation more often than defection if
b
c
>
(b
c
)∗
=
σ + 1
σ − 1
=
3
2
k. (49)
Small values of k decrease the crucial ratio
(
b
c
)∗
. This gives more advantage to co-
operators to emerge more likely than defectors. This is a natural consequence of the key
relationship qC|C − qC|D = 1/(k− 1). A cooperator is connected to more cooperators than
a defector. A graph with fewer connection increases the formation of cooperators’ clusters.
A graph with a large connections should promote defection. Since qC|C − qC|D =
1/(k−1) ≈ 0, then a cooperator is linked to the same number of cooperators as a defector,
qC|C ≈ qC|D. An increasing value of k demands a large cooperation effort, for selection to
favor cooperation more than defection.
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have studied an updating rule of two rounds. In the first round, an
individual compares its payoff to a tolerance index. Satisfied individuals will keep their
current strategies with a probability higher than 1/2. Dissatisfied individuals will keep
their current strategies with probability lower than 1/2.
Before investing their efforts in gathering social information, individuals play with
their strategies to reach their aspiration levels. Satisfied individuals will maintain their
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strategies. Unsatisfied individuals will invest their resources in gathering social information
to imitate successful strategies.
These mechanisms help to maintain the best strategies, which give a satisfactory return
to their players. For rational dissatisfied individuals, it would make the best sense, if they
imitate successful strategies by turning to their neighborhood. The classical aspiration-
based update rule suggests that dissatisfied individuals will switch their strategies, which
stands in contradiction with their rationality. It will be more realistic to let dissatisfied
individuals choose successful strategies.
Individuals are ranged over N nodes, where each node is occupied by an individual.
Each node is linked to k other nodes, where k is a constant. The traditional well-mixed
population is represented by a complete graph, k = N . The circular mode is represented
by a very limited connections, k = 2.
Under the classical aspiration mechanisms, dissatisfied individuals discover randomly
other strategies. The aspiration level is a constant, ∆α = 0. In such a case, weak
selection favors defection more than cooperation (Du et al. [Du(2014)]). This is natural
since cooperators have a lower payoff than defectors. As a result, they will update their
strategies more frequently than defectors, which promotes defection.
For a general game and by pair approximation for k ≥ 3, we have shown the selection
favors cooperation more often than defection if
3k + 2
2k
(R− P ) +
3k − 2
2k
(S − T ) + ∆α > 0. (50)
3k+2
2k (R − P ) +
3k−2
2k (S − T ) quantifies the effect of payoff difference between cooperators
and defectors. ∆α quantifies the effect of difference in aspiration level. Pair approximation
fails to characterize the evolutionary process for k = 2 and k ≈ N . For circular model
k = 2 and by an exact calculation, we extend these results.
In the limit case k →∞, condition (50) becomes
3
2
(R+ S − T − P ) + ∆α > 0, (51)
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which is exactly the same condition obtained in well-mixed population by an exact calcu-
lation. For symmetric aspiration, ∆α = 0, it is exactly the risk dominance condition in
a coordination game (Harsanyi and Selten [Harsanyi(1988)]). A coordination game is the
case where R > T and P > S. In a coordination game, selection always favors the risk
dominance equilibrium more often than the other strategy.
Under the additive prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperators have a higher fitness if they are
linked to a higher number of cooperators, while defectors have a lower fitness if they are
linked to a higher number of defectors. The key relationship is qC|C − qC|D =
1
k−1 . For k
small enough, we have qC|C >> qC|D, which means that a cooperator is linked to a higher
number of cooperators than a defector. As a result, cooperators have a higher fitness
than defectors. A graph with a fewer connections should promote cooperative behavior.
For k too large, we have qC|C ≈ qC|D. In this case, both cooperators and defectors are
linked to the same number of cooperators. This plays in favor of defectors since they have
a higher fitness than cooperators. A graph with a large number of connections should
oppose cooperative behavior.
Moreover, the level of cooperation in structured populations is not the same as in well-
mixed populations. Cooperative behavior is favored in certain networks as in a well-mixed
populations. Other networks favors defection.
For symmetric aspiration, ∆α = 0, selection favors cooperation more than defection if
b/c > 3k2 , where k is the connectivity. However, in a well-mixed population always weak
selection favors defectors spreading in the population (Appendix C). Networks with a
fewer connections should promote cooperation. Networks with a large connections should
promote defection.
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8 Appendix A: Coefficients in Eq (18) in the quasi-steady
state
In the quasi-steady state and by using Eq (23), we express the different probabilities of
Eq (7) in terms of pC as
pD =1− pC ,
qD|C =1− qC|C =
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pC),
qC|D =
qD|CpC
1− pC
=
k − 2
k − 1
pC ,
qD|D =1− qC|D = 1−
k − 2
k − 1
pC ,
pCD =qD|CpC =
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pC)pC . (52)
This leads to an important equality
qC|C + qD|D =
k
k − 1
. (53)
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Hence, by using Eqs (52) and (53), the quantity of interest in Eq (18) become
IR =
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)(qC|C + qD|D)
]k − 1
k
qC|C
=
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)×
k
k − 1
]k − 1
k
(
pC +
1− pC
k − 1
)
=
3k + 2 + (3k + 2)(k − 2)pC
k
,
IS =1 + (k − 1)qD|C +
2(k − 1)2
k
(qC|C + qD|D)qD|C +
2(k − 1)qD|D
k
=1 + (k − 1)
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pC) +
2(k − 1)2
k
k
k − 1
k − 2
k − 1
(1− pC) +
2(k − 1)
k
(
1−
k − 2
k − 1
pC
)
=
3k2 − 3k − 2− (k − 2)(3k + 2)pC
k
,
IT =1 + (k − 1)qC|D +
2(k − 1)2
k
(qC|C + qD|D)qC|D +
2(k − 1)qC|C
k
=1 + (k − 1)
k − 2
k − 1
pC +
2(k − 1)2
k
k
k − 1
k − 2
k − 1
pC +
2(k − 1)
k
( 1
k − 1
+
k − 2
k − 1
pC
)
=
(k + 2) + (3k + 2)(k − 2)pC
k
,
IP =
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)(qC|C + qD|D)
]k − 1
k
qD|D
=
[
k + 2 + 2(k − 1)
k
k − 1
]k − 1
k
(
1−
k − 2
k − 1
pC
)
=
(3k + 2)(k − 1)− (3k + 2)(k − 2)pC
k
. (54)
9 Appendix B: Circular model (k = 2)
Suppose that we have N sites over a circle numbered 1, 2 . . . , N . Each site is occupied by
an individual. Individual who is located at site l can interact with its neighbors located at
sites l−1 and l+1, through game matrix (2). The same graph is used for the replacement
graph. Dissatisfied individuals imitate their direct neighbors.
At each time step, each individual interacts with its direct neighbors. Then, an in-
dividual I is chosen at random. It will update its strategy with probability (4). In this
case, it will imitate the strategy of a direct neighbor J , with probability proportional to
its fitness fJ = 1 + δΠJ . Otherwise, individual I will keep its current strategy.
The population is initially consisted entirely of defectors. A new cooperator is intro-
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duced on a particular site. We have two scenarios. This cooperator will generate a lineage
of cooperators without overlapping one beside the other, which will take over the popu-
lation. In this case, the population ends with only cooperators (extinction of defectors).
The second scenario is that this individual might die before reproducing or generate a
lineage that disappears (extinction of cooperators). Let ρC(δ) the probability of the first
scenario. Likewise, ρD(δ) is the probability that a single defector placed in a population of
cooperators will generate a lineage, which will take over the population. Using a recursive
argument (Karlin and Taylor [Karlin(1975)]), we have
ρC(δ) =
1
1 +
∑N−1
i=1
∏i
j=1
T−j
T+j
,
ρC(δ)
ρD(δ)
=
N−1∏
i=1
T+i
T−i
.
(55)
where T+i (resp. T
−
i ) is the transition probability of ”the number of cooperators increases
from i to i+1 in one time step” (resp.”the number of cooperators decreases from i to i−1
in one times step”).
9.1 Payoffs
Without loss of generality, suppose that sites l+ 1, . . . , l + i are occupied by cooperators,
while the other sites are occupied by defectors. Changes in the composition of the popu-
lation take place at the boundary between the two clusters: cooperators’ cluster formed
by sites l + 1, . . . , l + i and defectors’ cluster formed by the other sites. Changes in one
time step may happen at sites l, l + 1, l + i, l + i+ 1.
To find the transition probabilities T+i and T
−
i , the different payoffs of individuals
around the boundary should be known. The payoff of an individual depends on the
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number of its neighbors of each type. We have the following types of payoffs
ΠC,(1,1) =
R+ S
2
,
ΠD,(1,1) =
T + P
2
,
ΠC,(2,0) = R,
ΠC,(0,2) = S, (56)
ΠD,(2,0) = T,
ΠD,(0,2) = P,
where ΠX,(l,j) refer to the payoff of an X-player, who has l cooperators and j defectors as
neighbors, for X ∈ {C,D} and l + j = 2 is the graph degree.
9.2 Ratio of transition probabilities
The transition i → i + 1 takes place only if a defector, who is located at the boundary,
becomes a cooperator. This occurs with probability
T+i =
2
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αD−ΠD,(1,1))
×
fC,(1,1)
fC,(1,1) + fD,(0,2)
=
1
2N
+
δ
4N
[
ΠC,(1,1) + αD −ΠD,(0,2) −ΠD,(1,1)
]
+O(δ2). (57)
The transition i → i − 1 takes place only if a defector, who is located at the boundary,
becomes a cooperator. This occurs with probability
T−i =
2
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αC−ΠC,(1,1))
×
fD,(1,1)
fC,(2,0) + fD,(1,1)
=
1
2N
+
δ
4N
[
ΠD,(1,1) + αC −ΠC,(2,0) −ΠC,(1,1)
]
+O(δ2). (58)
Dividing Eq (57) by Eq (58), we obtain
T+i
T−i
= 1 +
δ
2
[
2(ΠC,(1,1) −ΠD,(1,1)) + ΠC,(2,0) −ΠD,(0,2) +∆α
]
+O(δ2). (59)
Note that Eq (59) is valid for i = 3, . . . , N − 3.
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For i = 2, only two cooperators are present in the population. Their payoffs are of
type ΠC,(1,1). As a result, we have
T−2 =
2
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αC−ΠC,(1,1))
×
fD,(1,1)
fC,(1,1) + fD,(1,1)
=
1
2N
+
δ
4N
[
ΠD,(1,1) − 2ΠC,(1,1) + αC
]
+O(δ2). (60)
The transition probability T+2 is the same in Eq (57). Then, the ratio becomes
T+2
T−2
= 1 +
δ
2
[
2(ΠC,(1,1) −ΠD,(1,1)) + ΠC,(1,1) −ΠD,(0,2) +∆α
]
+O(δ2). (61)
Likewise, for i = N − 2, we have
T+N−2
T−N−2
= 1 +
δ
2
[
2(ΠC,(1,1) −ΠD,(1,1)) + ΠC,(2,0) −ΠD,(1,1) +∆α
]
+O(δ2). (62)
Finally, for i = 1, only one cooperator is in the competition with N − 1 defectors. If it
decides to update its strategy, it will switch its strategy with probability 1 since its direct
neighbors are defectors. Therefore, we obtain
T−1 =
1
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αC−ΠC,(0,2))
=
1
2N
+
δ
4N
[
αC −ΠC,(0,2)
]
+O(δ2), (63)
whereas
T+1 =
2
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αD−ΠD,(1,1))
×
fC,(0,2)
fC,(0,2) + fD,(0,2)
=
1
2N
+
δ
4N
[
ΠC,(0,2) −ΠD,(0,2) + αD −ΠD,(1,1)
]
+O(δ2). (64)
Accordingly, the ratio becomes
T+1
T−1
= 1 +
δ
2
[
2ΠC,(0,2) −ΠD,(0,2) −ΠD,(1,1) +∆α
]
+O(δ2). (65)
Likewise, for i = N − 1, we have
T+N−1
T−N−1
= 1 +
δ
2
[
ΠC,(2,0) +ΠC,(1,1) − 2ΠD,(2,0) +∆α
]
+O(δ2). (66)
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9.3 Approximation of the fixation probabilities
We expand
∏i
j=1
T−j
T+j
up to the first-order in δ,
i∏
j=1
T−j
T+j
=
i∏
j=1
[
1 + δ ·
d
dδ
(T−j
T+j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
]
= 1 + δ ·
i∑
j=1
d
dδ
(T−j
T+j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2). (67)
Accordingly, we have
ρC(δ) =
1
N + δ ·
∑N−1
i=1
∑i
j=1
d
dδ
(
T−j
T+j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2)
=
1
N
+ δ ·
1
N
N−1∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
d
dδ
(T+j
T−j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2)
=
1
N
+ δ ·
1
N
N−1∑
j=1
(N − j)
d
dδ
(T+j
T−j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2),
ρC
ρD
(δ) = 1 + δ ·
N−1∑
j=1
d
dδ
(T+j
T−j
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2).
(68)
Substituting Eqs (59,61,62,65,66) in Eq (68) yield to
ρC(δ) =
1
N
+ δ ·
1
4N2
[
(2N2 − 7N + 7)R + (N2 + 2N − 3)S − (N2 − 2N + 5)T
− (2N2 − 3N − 5)P +N(N − 1)∆α
]
+O(δ2),
(69)
and
ρC
ρD
(δ) = 1 +
δ
2
[
(2N − 5)(R − P ) +N(S − T ) +N∆α
]
+O(δ2). (70)
10 Appendix C: Well-mixed population
Consider a well-mixed population of size N , where each individual can interact with any
other individual with the same probability through game matrix (2). At any time step,
all individuals interact by pairs to accumulate payoffs. Then, an individual I is chosen
at random to update its strategy. It will update its strategy with probability (4). In this
case, it imitates individual J , one of its neighbors, probability proportional to its fitness
30
fJ = 1+δΠJ . Otherwise, the current strategy of individual I will be maintained. Similarly
to appendix B, we have
ρC(δ) =
1
1 +
∑N−1
i=1
∏i
j=1
T−j
T+j
,
ρC(δ)
ρD(δ)
=
N−1∏
i=1
T+i
T−i
.
(71)
where T+i (resp. T
−
i ) is the transition probability i→ i+ 1 (resp. i→ i− 1).
Suppose that the population is composed of i cooperators and N − i defectors. Then,
the payoffs of a cooperator and a defector are given, respectively, by
ΠC,i =
(i− 1)R + (N − i)S
N − 1
ΠD,i =
iT + (N − i− 1)P
N − 1
. (72)
T+i is the probability that a defector, chosen to update its strategy, becomes a cooperator.
This occurs with probability
T+i =
N − i
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αD−ΠD,i)
×
ifC,i
ifC,i + (N − i− 1)fD,i
=
(N − i)i
2N(N − 1)
+ δ ·
(N − i)i
2N(N − 1)
×
[αD −ΠD,i
2
+
N − i− 1
N − 1
(ΠC,i −ΠD,i)
]
+O(δ2).
(73)
T−i is the probability that a cooperator, chosen to update its strategy, becomes a defector.
This occurs with probability
T−i =
i
N
×
1
1 + eδ(αC−ΠC,i)
×
(N − i)fD,i
(i− 1)fC,i + (N − i)fD,i
=
(N − i)i
2N(N − 1)
+ δ ·
(N − i)i
2N(N − 1)
[αC −ΠC,i
2
+
i− 1
N − 1
(ΠD,i −ΠC,i)
]
+O(δ2). (74)
Therefore, the ratio of transition probabilities is
T+i
T−i
= 1 +
δ
2
[3N − 5
N − 1
(ΠC,i −ΠD,i) + ∆α
]
+O(δ2). (75)
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Inserting Eq (75) in Eq (71) after expanding it up to the first-order in δ, we have
ρC(δ) =
1
N
+ δ ·
1
N
N−1∑
i=1
(N − i)
d
dδ
(T+i
T−i
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2)
=
1
N
+ δ ·
N − 1
4
[
3N − 5
3(N − 1)2
(
(N − 2)R+ (2N − 1)S − (N + 1)T − (2N − 4)P
)
+∆α
]
(76)
and
ρC
ρD
(δ) = 1 + δ ·
N−1∑
i=1
d
dδ
(T+i
T−i
)∣∣∣
δ=0
+O(δ2)
= 1 + δ ·
N − 1
2
[
3N − 5
2(N − 1)2
(
(N − 2)R+NS −NT − (N − 2)P
)
+∆α
]
+O(δ).
(77)
Note that Eqs (76) and (77) is valid for any finite population size N ≥ 2.
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